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BLOOD LIBEL:
RADICAL ISLAM'S CONSCRIPTION OF THE
LAW OF DEFAMATION INTO A LEGAL




On May 19, 2009, a panel of distinguished legal
professionals assembled in Washington, D.C., at a conference,
entitled Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of Radical Islam, to
discuss radical Islam's exploitation of Western libel laws to silence
authors and journalists who seek to expose terror-financing
networks and who criticize radical Islam. The discussion embodied
a cresting wave of public concern about the surprising ways
Western laws enable this assault.
This Article seeks to call attention to two critical mistakes
perpetuated by panelists at the conference and consistently present
in current libel lawfare scholarship. Foremost, no one has arrived at
an adequate definition for libel lawfare; instead, scholars
consistently talk past one another as they rely on a number of
different terms to describe the same phenomenon. Second, no one
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has sufficiently identified the crucial distinction between small- and
large-scale libel lawfare; instead, scholars talk of libel lawfare as if it
were one big problem. The purposes of this Article are to clear up
the confusion caused by the foregoing mistakes, examine how these
mistakes affect current legislative efforts to combat libel lawfare,
and offer a new way of looking at the libel lawfare problem as a
whole.
INTRODUCTION: WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE LIBEL
LAWFARE DEBATE?
On May 19, 2009, a panel of distinguished legal
professionals, national security experts, and public intellectuals
assembled in Washington, D.C., at a conference entitled Libel
Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of Radical Islam ("the Conference").'
The Conference provided a forum for what proved to be an
incandescent- and oftentimes incensed-debate about radical
Islam's exploitation of Western libel laws to silence authors and
journalists who expose terror-financing networks and criticize
radical Islam. More than this though, the debate embodied a
cresting wave of public concern-the culmination of almost a
decade of anxiety-about the surprising ways Western laws enable
this assault.
The received wisdom, at least among the panelists at the
Conference, is that libel lawfare is a genuine threat to free speech.
Many of the panelists cited the iconic case Ehrenfeld v. Bin
Mahfouz2 as one among many stirring reasons why the United
States Congress should pass federal legislation, entitled the Free
1. The Legal Project at the Middle East Forum, which arranges pro bono
legal representation for authors and journalists, provides financial support for
court costs, and tracks instances of libel lawfare, sponsored the conference,
along with organizations such as The Federalists Society. See The Legal
Project, About the Legal Project, http://www.legal-project.org/about.php (last
visited Feb. 27, 2010).
2. No. 04 Civ. 9641, 2006 WL 1096816, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006).
The Ehrenfeld case was a highly publicized defamation action brought in
British courts by Saudi billionaire Khalid bin Mahfouz over allegations in
Ehrenfeld's book linking him to terrorism. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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Speech Protection Act of 2009, 3 banning the enforcement of foreign
libel judgments.4  They also intermittently bewailed United
Nation's Resolution 7/19, Combating Defamation of Religions'-
along with many European and British hate speech laws-as
embodying similarly disturbing methods used by radical Islam to
subvert free speech globally. Despite their urgency and good
intentions, the panelists at the Conference perpetuated two crucial
mistakes.
Foremost, they consistently failed to provide an adequate
definition for libel lawfare. For example, the panelists used the
terms "radical Islam," "lawfare," "Islamist lawfare," "legal jihad,"
"soft jihad," "libel tourism," and "libel terrorism" in a synonymous
and remarkably haphazard fashion. The resulting confusion
seemed, at its worst, like a McCarthy-esque vilification of anyone
even accused of association with radical Islam and, at its best, a
colossally confusing whine-fest. Part I of this Article, entitled The
New Dictionary of Libel Lawfare, is devoted to resolving this
semantic confusion by offering a definitive lexicon for future
debates. It begins with some fairly self-evident-but critical-
observations about radical Islam, and proceeds to define other
terms, including libel lawfare itself, that have consistently been
misused.6
3. H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. (2009).
4. The New York State legislature unanimously passed the Libel
Terrorism Protection Act ("Rachel's Law") in 2008. The act appears as an
amendment to Civil Practice Law and Rules Rule 5304(b). N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5304(b) (McKinney 2010). Illinois passed virtually identical legislation several
months later, embodied in Public Act 095-0865 (2008). See 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-209 & 5/12-621 (West 2009). Similar federal legislation is
pending. Free Speech Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. (2009),
has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Courts
and Competition Policy. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has held
hearings considering the legislation. S. 449, 111th Cong. (2009).
5. H.R.C. Res. 7/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/19 (Mar. 27, 2008).
6. Debates involving core values like religion and free speech often
neglect to perform elementary tasks like this at the outset. This omission
usually transforms an otherwise thoughtful debate into an unhelpful shouting
match, where scholars simply talk past one another.
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The second mistake follows from the first. Despite
revealing a profound grasp of certain aspects of libel lawfare, the
panelists consistently ignored a crucial distinction necessary for a
deeper understanding of the libel lawfare problem as a whole.7 As
a result, the debate fell short of accurately depicting the libel
lawfare problem for what it truly is-the conscription of two very
different components of the law of defamation into a single legal
jihad against the West.8  Part II of this Article, entitled Re-
envisioning Libel Lawfare: A Crucial Distinction, proposes a
strategic vision that holistically reinterprets the libel lawfare
problem. To do so, it divides libel lawfare into two new concepts-
individual libel lawfare and global libel lawfare-which more aptly
describe the bigger picture. Each subsection of Part II examines in
further depth the crucial distinction embodied by these terms and
recommends ways to improve current efforts to combat libel
lawfare.
Finally, credible arguments exist that downplay the
existence of a libel lawfare problem at all. Notable media lawyer
John J. Walsh warns that, "if there is a [free speech] chilling effect
coming from overseas or anywhere else," he hasn't seen it. 9 Walsh
calls libel lawfare an overplayed concept that disrupts comity
between friendly allies and presents enormous mischief-making
opportunities for retaliation."' It is self-evident, however, as we
peruse online fora, legal scholarship, and Washington, D.C.
ballrooms, which are littered with armchair polemics about radical
7. At the conference, Alan Dershowitz stated, "[ilt sounds like you're
lumping together a range of issues with a very different case. You have to
persuade people by using finer distinctions." Alan Derschowitz, Remarks at
Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of Radical Islam Conference (May 19,
2009).
8. I use the term "law of defamation" to describe the corpus of Western
laws designed to protect all kinds of reputational interests. These include libel
and slander law in America and England, the concept of "defamation of
religion," and hate speech and blasphemy laws.
9. John J. Walsh, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of
Radical Islam Conference (May 19, 2009).
10. Id. See also John J. Walsh, The Myth of Libel Tourism, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 20, 2007, at 2 (arguing that "libel tourism" is a threat to the "comity" that
forms the basis of judgment recognition in international law).
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Islam's use of libel lawfare, that a problem-either real or
perceived -exists.
I. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF LIBEL LAWFARE
At the conference, Brooke Goldstein, the director of the
Legal Project at the Middle East Forum, along with esteemed
panelists Alan Dershowitz, Frank Gaffney, Andy McCarthy,
Douglas Murray, and many others, used the following terms almost
interchangeably: radical Islam, lawfare, Islamist libel lawfare, libel
lawfare, soft jihad, legal jihad, libel tourism, and libel terrorism.
Legal debates like this one often confront what Ronald Dworkin
calls "the semantic problem."'" Namely, if we insist on taking the
position that libel lawfare is a problem, we must accurately and
consistently define the terms we use to describe it.
A. Radical Islam
Of late, there has been a great deal of careless lip wagging
by commentators who aspire to transform radical Islam into
something fundamentally indistinguishable from Islam generally."
Although it appears obvious that the sins of its radical offspring
ought not to be visited upon Islam as a whole, a brief digression
11. The idea of the semantic problem as it pertains to questions of legal
philosophy is best illustrated here:
[We] can argue sensibly with one another if, but only if,
we all accept and follow the same criteria for deciding
when our claims are sound .... You and I can sensibly
discuss how many books I have on my shelf, for example,
only if we both agree, at least roughly, about what a book
is. We can disagree over borderline cases: I may call
something a slim book that you would call a pamphlet.
But we cannot disagree over what I call[] pivotal cases. If
you do not count my copy of Moby-Dick as a book
because in your view novels are not books, any
disagreement is bound to be senseless.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy, Beyond Terrorism: The Islamist
Threat is worse than you think, NAT'L REV., Apr. 20, 2009, at 39.
[Vol. 8
into the definition of radical Islam-and how it differs from
Islam-is still warranted. Also known as the Islamist Movement or
Islamism, radical Islam seeks to impose
the tenets of Islam and, specifically Shari'a law,
as a legal, political, religious and judicial
authority both in Muslim states and in the
West. It is generally composed of two wings -
that which operates violently... and that which
operates lawfully, conducting a "soft jihad"
within our media, government and court
systems; through Shari'a banking; and within
our school systems. .... 1
"Islam is not merely a religion" 4 for those who interpret the
Koran and the Hadith literally and institutionalize the harshest
characteristics of Shari'a law in countries like Taliban-led
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Northern Sudan. "It is a
comprehensive socioeconomic and political system, which believers
take to be ordained by Allah, its elements compulsory and non-
negotiable."'" Globally, it dominates enormous oil wealth, many
large states, and terror organizations, and seeks to bring about an
Islamic world order.16 With respect to free speech and libel lawfare,
one tenet of Shari'a law is to punish those who
criticize Islam and to silence speech considered
blasphemous of its prophet Mohammed. While
the violent arm of the Islamist movement
attempts to silence speech by burning cars
when Danish cartoons of Mohammed are
published, [and] by murdering film directors
such as Theo van Gogh . . . the lawful arm is
skillfully maneuvering within Western court
13. Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, Strategic View: Lawfare
Part 1, How Islamist Lawfare Tactics Are Targeting Free Speech, COUNTER
TERRORIST, Feb./Mar. 2009, at 16.
14. McCarthy, supra note 12, at 40.
15. Id.
16. See Frank Gaffney, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of
Radical Islam Conference (May 19, 2009) ("Shari'a is a world program aimed
at the imposition of global theocracy.").
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systems, hiring lawyers and suing to silence its
critics.
In the same way that Stalinist Communism differed from
Maoist or Marxist Communism (and yet still pursued a materialist
goal), different camps of radical Islam can operate independently
without compromising their common pursuit of an Islamic world
order. 8
The Sufi Islamic tradition, which is prominent in Turkey, for
example, is a religion of peace and tolerance and is compatible with
Western values such as free speech and women's rights. Radical
Islam, on the other hand, is very dangerous. It endorses violence,
terrorism, subjugation of women, and the overthrow of the West
and its freedoms. Martin Amis summarizes more perfectly:
So, to repeat, we respect Islam -the donor of
countless benefits to mankind, and the
possessor of a thrilling history. But Islamism?
No, we can hardly be asked to respect a creedal
wave that calls for our own elimination. More,
we regard the Great Leap Backward as a tragic
development in Islam's story, and now in ours.
Naturally we respect Islam. But we do not
respect Islamism, just as we respect
17. Goldstein & Meyer, supra note 13, at 16.
18. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND
THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). In The Clash of Civilizations,
Huntington hypothesized a post-Cold War world order in which the increased
role of religion in world politics filled the vacuum created by a loss of political
ideologies such as Soviet Communism. Because this culture war sees mutually
exclusive ideologies battle for supremacy-the West and liberal democracy vs.
radical Islam and Shari'a law-a clash of civilizations becomes unpreventable.
See also THOMAS P. M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP (2004).
Likewise, The Pentagon's New Map explains how, when globalization and
Internet connectivity increase across borders, Western-dominated civilizations
inevitably clash with areas suffused with high levels of religiosity-in this case,
Islamic Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The resistance to such
connectivity, based on religion or culture, becomes a radical and existential
struggle to cling to traditional values. Id. Thus, any detractor from the danger
that radical Islam poses to free society who dismisses the whole affair as
conspiratorial fidgeting arguably misses the broader cultural and geo-political
reasons for radical Islam's ascendancy.
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Muhammad and do not respect Muhammad
Atta. 9
B. Lawfare
Generally, lawfare can be defined as "the use of the law as a
weapon of war, or the pursuit of strategic aims through aggressive
legal maneuvers."2" By itself, the term does not refer specifically to
libel or to radical Islam. It has been used in the aftermath of World
War II, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in China's rise as a global
superpower, and in other sanguinary conflicts throughout the
21years. Put simply, lawfare's goal is to exploit the law as an
unconventional means of confronting a superior military power.22
C. Islamist Lawfare
Islamist lawfare is simply the use of lawfare by Islamists.
Again, the term does not refer specifically to libel. For example,
"Al-Qaeda training manuals instruct its captured militants to file
claims of torture or other forms of abuse so as to reposition
themselves as victims against their captors., 23 Likewise during the
protracted Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Islamist group Hamas has
arguably used lawfare in the conflict over Israel's controversial
24security fence. These instances clearly constitute lawfare,
19. MARTIN AMIs, THE SECOND PLANE 50 (2008).
20. Goldstein & Meyer, supra note 13, at 15 (citing Charles J. Dunlap,
Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21"
Century Conflicts, prepared for the Humanitarian Challenges in Military
Intervention Conference, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, Nov. 29, 2001 and Jeremy Rabkin, Lawfare: The International
Court of Justice rules in favor of terrorism, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2004, at A14,
available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110005366).
21. See generally Goldstein & Meyer, supra note 13, at 14 (describing the
rise of Islamist lawfare).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 15.
24. See id. (Goldstein and Meyer attribute to lawfare the "2004 decision
by the United Nations' International Court of Justice declaring Israel's
security fence a crime against humanity .... " ).
20101 BLOOD LIBEL
conducted by Islamists, but have no relation to libel law. Islamist
lawfare is often used synonymously with the legal jihad or soft
jihad.25
D. Islamist Libel Lawfare and Libel Lawfare
The term Islamist libel lawfare (or just libel lawfare, its
abbreviation) shapes the philosophical core of this paper. It
describes the use of lawfare by Islamists in the area of libel law.
Unfortunately, commentators repeatedly make two major errors.
First, libel lawfare is oftentimes used interchangeably with the term
libel tourism. 26 This generates much confusion among legislators
who clumsily propose cures for the libel tourism problem, when
they likely mean to propose cures for libel lawfare. Second, the
term is inherently flawed. That is, it imputes guilt to any individual
who sues a journalist for allegations about ties to radical Islam-
regardless of whether those allegations are true or false. Subsection
1 defines libel tourism and distinguishes it from libel lawfare, while
subsection 2 investigates the term libel lawfare's semantic
shortcomings.
1. Libel Lawfare is NOT Libel Tourism
Libel tourism is not coextensive with libel lawfare. It is far
more expansive and arises out of the plaintiff-friendly nature of
English libel law-or, conversely, the plaintiff-hostile nature of
American libel law. It refers to the improper use, by any kind of
plaintiff (not just Islamists), of English libel law. Under English
25. These synonyms for Islamist lawfare were widely employed at the
conference. Reference to the "jihad" clearly invokes the ideological mainstay
of Islamism and the use of "soft" or "legal" as a prefix clearly invokes the
lawfare tactic.
26. The term "libel terrorism" is also a synonym for "Islamist libel
lawfare" and "libel lawfare." It also happens to be a dysphemistic sound-alike
for "libel tourism," which is probably the source of some confusion and one of
the reasons it is omitted from this discussion. "Libel tourism" refers to the
improper use of English libel law by a libel claimant and is discussed in the
next section.
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law, a libel claimant must prove, on balance of the probabilities,
that the defendant "published" a defamatory statement referring to
the claimant. The claimant does not have to prove that the
statement was false or that the defendant was at fault. Moreover,
non-resident claimants are entitled to bring their claim in England,
so long as they possess a modicum of reputation in the jurisdiction
and the defamatory communication was published more than an
insignificant number of times there.27
Because American defamation law has been
constitutionalized, i.e., the common law must comport with the
United States Constitution's First Amendment, a claimant bears a
higher burden of proof if he brings his case stateside.18 Depending
on the public reputation of the claimant, and sometimes the
defendant, the claimant may be required to prove both the falsity of
the statement and the fault of the defendant. The bellwether
American case here is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'9 which,
along with its progeny, holds that if the claimant is a public official
or a public figure, the claimant is required to prove that the
defendant acted with actual malice, which has been defined as
actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement or reckless
disregard as to its falsity. 3 In practice, proving actual malice is very
difficult, except in the most egregious cases. Because defamation
cases are harder to prove in America, well-known claimants, i.e.,
public officials or public figures, would likely rather bring libel
claims in England if they meet the minimal requirements of English
law. Thus, in one sense, libel tourism is nothing more than good,
old-fashioned forum shopping. For instance, libel tourism
encompasses seemingly trivial cases, such as when "[f]ilmstars and
27. See, e.g., Berezovsky v. Michaels [2000] UKHL 25 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (holding England to be an appropriate forum for suit because "there
had been a significant distribution of the defamatory material in England and
the plaintiffs had reputations in England to protect").
28. See generally Raymond W. Beauchamp, Note, England's Chilling
Forecast: the Case for Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English
Defamation Actions from Chilling American Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
3073, 3077-78 (2006) (contrasting English and American defamation law).
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. Id. at 279-80.
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pop idols claiming their reputations have been tarnished by the US
tabloids have decided that London is the place to sue their
antagonists,"'" and not-so-trivial (but nonetheless non-lawfare)
cases, such as when Russian oligarchs sue American magazines for
unflattering stories about thuggish business tactics. 2
When those accused of links to radical Islam take advantage
of England's favorable libel laws, the term libel tourism also
encompasses the term libel lawfare. Because of this overlap, people
often mistakenly assume that libel tourism means the same thing as
libel lawfare. Because of this confusion, the public debate has
unfortunately lumped them together and given the same moral
urgency to the fight against libel tourism as should legitimately be
commanded by the fight against libel lawfare, thereby diluting the
legitimate distinction and making it more difficult to construct a
workable jurisprudence to address libel lawfare. As Part II of this
paper delves into the fine distinctions between two kinds of libel
lawfare, the analysis will no doubt benefit from removing the
• • 33
confusing term, libel tourism, from the discussion.
2. The Term Libel Lawfare is Inherently Flawed
Having distinguished libel tourism from libel lawfare,
another very serious issue to address is that the term libel lawfare
imputes guilt to any individual who sues a journalist for allegations
about ties to radical Islam-regardless of whether the allegations
are true or false. Although some radical Islamists probably do use
31. Robert Verkaik, Libel Tourist Invasion: U.S. celebrities are being
actively courted by media lawyers to take advantage of Britain's tougher libel
laws and bring their cases to London, INDEP. (U.K.), Aug. 21, 2008, at 8.
Verkaik states that "tales of adultery and spiteful tittle-tattle" used to be the
"price of celebrity" in America until the U.K. declared itself open for libel
tourism. Id.
32. See id. (describing the Berezovsky case).
33. It is unlikely that states like New York would have passed the Libel
Terrorism Protection Act-nor would Congress have entertained the Free
Speech Protection Act-if all they were worried about was a little celebrity
forum-shopping. See, e.g., H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. (2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5304(b) (McKinney 2010). 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209 & 5/12-621
(West 2009).
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this tactic to subvert free speech, there is no doubt that some
individuals who have been wrongly associated with radical Islam
have rightly sued to clear their names. In the latter cases, the term
libel lawfare is clearly being misapplied; however, how do we know
where to make a legitimate legal distinction?
The only way to determine legally if someone accused of
having ties to radical Islam actually has those ties is through fact-
finding in a lawsuit, the fear of which many of the panelists cited as
the primary chilling effect on free speech. This tautology reveals an
embarrassing and sobering fact-so-called libel lawfare cases, such
as the Ehrenfeld case, may not even be libel lawfare after all.
Although some of the panelists at the conference may be happy to
"call 'em like they see 'em," and brand as libel lawfare any libel suit
brought by someone accused of having ties to radical Islam,
rigorous scholarship demands something more.
There may be no good way out of this dilemma-the term
may just be inherently flawed. However, if the panelists and future
commentators realize that no effective gate-keeping tool by which
to determine the good cases from the bad ones has yet been
identified, they may not be as quick to brand as libel lawfare every
case involving allegations about radical Islam. Part II of this Article
suggests a way to alleviate the problem even further. By appending
the prefix "individual" to small-scale libel lawfare like the
Ehrenfeld case, it suggests that individual libel lawfare embodies
disputes that should be evaluated on an individual, case-by-case
basis-and thus can probably be addressed without resort to
federal legislation. Conversely, by adding the prefix "global" to
large-scale libel lawfare such as hate speech laws and U.N.
Resolutions "combating defamation of religions," it suggests that
global libel lawfare has a worldwide effect, not only upon writers
and journalists in the West, but also upon moderate Muslims living
in Islamist countries who may bravely seek to out their radical co-
religionists. This act of relabeling hopefully will create a new
strategic vision, which reinterprets libel lawfare as the conscription
of two very different components of the law of defamation into a
single legal jihad against the West.
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II. RE-ENVISIONING LIBEL LAWFARE: A CRUCIAL DISTINCTION
On the day of the conference, Aaron Eitan Meyer and
Brooke Goldstein posted an article on The Washington Post's blog
On Faith: Guest Voices,34 the gist of which signaled a turning point
in our understanding of libel lawfare. The post, titled The Next
Phase of Islamist Lawfare, hinted at a deeper, more comprehensive
connection between individual libel lawfare cases and a steady
increase in some alarming global developments, such as the U.N.
Resolution 7/19, Combating Defamation of Religions, England's
denial of entry to Geert Wilders, the Islamist critic and member of
the European Parliament, and the maelstrom surrounding the
republication of the Danish cartoons of Muhammad.: The
Washington Times ran a similar article online on the same day, in
which Goldstein and Meyer reemphasized their point: "along with a
number of individual lawsuits aimed at silencing critics of radical
Islam, terrorism, and terrorist funding, freedom of speech is under
siege ... and ... while steps have been taken to counteract some
forms of this legal warfare, or 'lawfare,' there is a distinct need for a
counteroffensive. Despite the cogency of Meyer and Goldstein's
deep concerns, their articles would have benefitted from analyzing
the real distinction between the small- and large-scale types of libel
lawfare. In order to mount a "counteroffensive" to defend Western
values effectively, the nature of these two threats must be
understood.
34. Posting of Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer to On Faith:
Guest Voices, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2009/
05/thenextphase-of islamistlawfare.html (May 19, 2009, 00:11 EST).
35. Id. ("Generally, lawfare may be roughly divided into two categories:
(1) small-scale attempts to silence individuals who write critically about Islam,
terrorism and terrorist funding; and (2) attempts by regional and global
organizations to redefine [read: curtail] freedom of speech.").
36. Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, 'Lawfare' Gains Ground:
U.N. Resolution on 'defaming' a case in point, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/19/lawfare-gains-ground/.
426 [Vol. 8
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A. What is Individual Libel Lawfare?37
Individual libel lawfare primarily occurs in two situations.
Foremost, it occurs when individuals with tenuous connections to
England bring libel suits for allegations that claim the individuals
have ties to terrorism. This is libel lawfare with a libel tourism
37. There has been a steady increase in individual libel lawfare in the
past ten years. For an exhaustive listing of some of the more shocking
instances, see Brooke Goldstein, Welcome to 'Lawfare'-A New Type of Jihad,
FAMILY SEC. MATTERS, Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.legal-project.org/article/241.
A summary of these instances, obtained from the above-mentioned article, is
included below:
In 1998, a Muslim visitor to an AOL chat room named
Noah considered posts by other visitors blasphemous and
defamatory against Islam. Noah then sued AOL for libel,
attempting a class action on behalf of all Muslim chat
room participants and claiming that AOL wrongfully
refused to prevent participants from posting anti-Islamic
comments. The court properly dismissed the case against
AOL, for failure to state a cause of action. In 2003, the
Council on American-Islamic Relations ("CAIR") sued
U.S. Congressman Cass Ballenger after a Charlotte
Observer interview was published, in which Ballenger
called CAIR "a fundraising arm for Hezbollah." The
court ruled that Ballenger's statements were made in the
scope of his public duties and were therefore protected
speech in the interest of public concern. In 2004, CAIR
sued Andrew Whitehead, an American activist and
blogger, for $1.3 million for maintaining the website Anti-
CAIR.net.org, on which Whitehead listed CAIR as an
Islamist organization with ties to terrorist groups. After
CAIR refused Whitehead's discovery requests, CAIR
withdrew its claims against Whitehead and the case was
dismissed with prejudice. In 2008, when Joe Kaufman,
chairman of Americans Against Hate, traveled to Texas
to lead a ten-person protest against the Islamic Circle of
North America outside an event the group was sponsoring
at Six Flags theme park, he was served with a temporary
restraining order and sued for defamation and
harassment. (Since publication of Goldstein's article, the
Texas federal court has dismissed Joe Kaufman's suit).
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overlap, i.e., when radical Islamists go forum shopping in England;
thus, it should be called international individual libel lawfare. It
can also occur in American courts if, for example, the claimant is
unable to confect a sufficient jurisdictional nexus in England. This
is libel lawfare without a libel tourism overlap, i.e., when radical
Islamists file frivolous libel suits in the "correct" jurisdiction; thus, it
should be called homegrown individual libel lawfare. When the
homegrown kind occurs in America, it can be considered more
uniformly frivolous, since the expectation of winning in America is
greatly diminished by the "actual malice" standard of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.3
To be fair, many of the homegrown individual libel lawfare
cases brought in America and in England ultimately end in
dismissals in favor of the defendant. However,
[o]ften the mere threat of suit is enough to
intimidate publishers into silence, regardless of
the merit of their author's works. In 2007,
when wealthy Saudi Arabian businessman,
Khalid bin Mahfouz, threatened to sue
Cambridge University Press for publishing the
book Alms for Jihad, by American authors
Robert Collins and J Millard Burr, Cambridge
Press immediately capitulated, offered a public
apology to Mahfouz, took the book out of print
and ordered the destruction of all unsold copies
and the removal of the book from the shelves
of libraries-a directive certain libraries
refused to follow.
39
The Alms for Jihad case involves homegrown individual
libel lawfare because the book was published in England and the
suit was brought in that jurisdiction. However, homegrown cases
are financially burdensome and riddled with elements of
38. 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
39. Goldstein, supra note 37. At the conference Andy McCarthy called
this "the invisible hand." stating that the "intimidating effect of the judgment
itself is the point." Andy McCarthy, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing
Criticism of Radical Islam Conference (May 19, 2009).
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intimidation. In Alms for Jihad, the burden was apparently so
great that the publishing arm of the world's second oldest English-
speaking university "completely capitulated to bin Mahfouz,
offering a comprehensive apology and substantial damages,"
despite the book being properly sourced with hundred of
references, and despite Cambridge Press being provided with all of
the source materials by the book's authors .
Although the Alms for Jihad case shows the danger of
homegrown individual libel lawfare, the most famous instance of
international libel lawfare, which is also the most popular kind, is
the Ehrenfeld case. By understanding what really went on in
Ehrenfeld-as opposed to the rhetoric of its critics on both sides-
we can examine the motivations behind individual libel lawfare
suits, explore the legal questions raised, and investigate America's
efforts to combat them, namely New York's Libel Terrorism
Protection Act 42 and its proposed federal counterpart, the Free
Speech Protection Act of 2009.43
B. The Ehrenfeld Case
Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld's book, Funding Evil: How Terrorism
is Financed and How to Stop It, identified Khalid bin Mahfouz, a
wealthy Saudi businessman, as a terror financier. 4 Ehrenfeld wrote
40. Because of the presence of conditional fee agreements and "win
uplifts" of up to one hundred percent for claimant's lawyers, legal costs in
defamation and privacy suits in England can be enormous. See generally
Campbell v. MGN Ltd. [20041 UKHL 22, [20041 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (in which famous fashion model Naomi Campbell sued for
invasion of privacy over pictures taken of her outside a drug rehab facility;
trial costs were over £377,000, appeal costs were £114,000, and House of Lords
costs were £594,000).
41. Alyssa Lappen, The Fly in the bin Mahfouz Ointment,
FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE, Aug. 6, 2007, http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?
ARTID=27641.
42. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304 (McKinney 2010).
43. H.R. 1304, Illth Cong. (2009).
44. During the writing of this article, bin Mahfouz passed away on
August 23, 2009. See Douglas Martin, Obituary, Khalid bin Mahfouz, Saudi
Banker, Dies at 60, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/27/world/middleeast/27mahfouz.html.
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that "Saudi charities that are known to have funded al-Qaeda and
other Islamist groups often have incestuous ties to one another"
and listed more than ten charities supported by the al-Rajhi and bin
Mahfouz Saudi banking families that were identified as supporting
al-Qaeda.45
The book was published widely in the U.S. and was made
available through online retailers. Ehrenfeld's British publisher
declined to publish the book because bin Mahfouz threatened to
sue the publisher for defamation. Bin Mahfouz nevertheless sued
Ehrenfeld in a British court after twenty-three copies of her book
were sold online in the United Kingdom. Because Ehrenfeld chose
not to appear before the British court, bin Mahfouz obtained a
default judgment against her, including a substantial monetary
award and an injunction against distribution of the book in the
United Kingdom.i
Ehrenfeld sought declaratory relief in the Southern District
of New York to prevent enforcement of the judgment in the United
States.47 However, in 2006, the court granted bin Mahfouz's motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, on the correct doctrinal
basis that bin Mahfouz had not purposefully availed himself of the
laws of New York and therefore "could not be haled into court
there. ',4  After this procedural defeat, Ehrenfeld began her public
campaign to change American law to protect authors like herself
from becoming legal fugitives from English libel judgments and
from being forced to live under the shadow of potential
enforcement of those judgments in the United States. By 2008,
Ehrenfeld had persuaded the state of New York to pass the Libel
45. RACHEL EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL: How TERRORISM IS
FINANCED -AND HOW TO STOP IT. THE BOOK THE SAUDIS DON'T WANT
YOU TO READ 37 (2003).
46. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9461, 2006 WL 1096816, at *1-
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006).
47. Id. at *2.
48. Id at *1. Purposeful availment is a linchpin issue for purposes of
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. The defendant
must have availed himself purposefully of the benefits and laws of that
jurisdiction before being haled into court there. See generally Worldwide
Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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Terrorism Protection Act, also known as Rachel's Law.49 Similar
federal legislation, the Free Speech Protection Act, is currently
pending in the United States House of Representatives and the
Senate Judiciary Committee."'
C. What's Wrong with The American Legislative Response
Rachel's Law, much like the proposed Free Speech
Protection Act, consists of two central provisions. First, a foreign
defamation judgment need only be recognized if the court
determines that the law applied by the foreign jurisdiction provides
the same freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the
constitutions of New York and the United States.5 Second, New
York courts have personal jurisdiction over any claimant who has
obtained a foreign defamation judgment against a resident of New
York for the purpose of granting declaratory relief with respect to
the foreign judgment. 52 In other words, the Act denies judges the
discretion to determine whether a given judgment is
constitutionally sound, that is, if the foreign court applied less
expansive free speech protections than those provided by the First
Amendment.5 3 Because the First Amendment provides the most
robust protection of free speech in the world, this amounts to an
outright ban on the enforcement of foreign defamation judgments
in the United States. Unfortunately, the outright ban miscalculates
the nature of individual libel lawfare in the following four ways and,
as a result, probably does more harm than good.
49. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304 (McKinney 2010).
50. See H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 449, 111th Cong. (2009).
51. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8).
52. Id.
53. In addition to allowing journalists to obtain personal jurisdiction over
foreign litigants, the federal legislation also allows for the award of treble
damages if, during the action for declaratory judgment, it is determined that
the person bringing the foreign lawsuit intentionally engaged in a scheme to
suppress rights under the First Amendment. H.R. 1304, § 3(d).
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1. The current legislation ignores the fact that individual libel
lawfare cases contain truth claims
Individual libel lawfare cases contain truth claims, e.g.,
either bin Mahfouz funded terror or he did not. This fact may seem
self-evident, but it is consistently ignored. For example, bin
Mahfouz claims to have successfully sued or settled with over thirty
other publications linking him with terrorism. Moreover, he
publishes those judgments on his website, as testament to his
"innocence."5 4 Because a billionaire Saudi banker probably does
not need the proportionately paltry sums he is awarded in these
cases, only two other possible motivations exist for his suits. Either
he is innocent and suing to vindicate his tarnished reputation, or he
is guilty and engaged in a baseless scheme to subvert the truth.
Whatever conclusion courts reach, one thing remains clear:
examination of the evidence and motivations underlying each case
is the only way to make these determinations. One cannot simply
rely on the kind of law being applied to the case-one must look at
the case itself." A mandatory federal ban precludes such an
inquiry.
54. Bin Mahfouz Information, http:// www.binmahfouz.info/news_
20050503.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
55. At the conference, John J. Walsh stated:
There has never been a successful enforcement yet of an
English or other foreign court libel judgment in the
United States since New York Times v. Sullivan, and the
cases following it have been the law of the land. They've
all been defeated on the basis of the public policy
exception to the laws that govern the recognition of
foreign judgments. A lot of you will think that's as it
should be. My problem with the libel tourism laws as
proposed . . . is that they are based on a simple
comparative law test that our system is more protective
[of free speech] than it is in the U.K., or Canada,
Australia, Ireland, and so forth. And therefore you can't
enforce this judgment. My view, is that there are
meritorious cases . . . [blut the laws that are proposed
don't just purport to affect the enforcement of law
brought by an Islamist. They ban every libel judgment in
[Vol. 8
2. The current legislation ignores the fact that many individual
libel lawfare cases can be defeated by "responsible journalism" in
England and in America
Even if the evidence reveals that the claimant was defamed,
authors and journalists can still avoid liability if they can show that
they used reliably high standards, such as those outlined in
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,56 in going forward with those
facts. Ehrenfeld relied upon official government and CIA
documents that named bin Mahfouz as a terror financier. This
would almost certainly satisfy the standard elucidated under
England's Reynolds privilege and, although not preventing the case
from being brought, would likely result in summary dismissal or
success at trial. Many critics incorrectly suggest that, in bin
Mahfouz's High Court case, Ehrenfeld was not allowed to rely on a
Reynolds privilege and was actually expected to prove that her
any foreign court that's brought to the United States. In
my mind, that has enormous potential for disrupting
international comity, that mutual respect between
countries, particularly with your friendly allies. It also has
enormous mischief-making capabilities for retaliation....
[V]ery prestigious institutions, such as the American Law
Institute ... , have put an enormous amount of time...
into pushing [for] laws that provide for mutual respect....
These laws are putting that in jeopardy ... throwing out
the baby with the bath water.
John J. Walsh, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of Radical Islam
Conference (May 19, 2009).
56. See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (P.C.
1915) (appeal taken from Eng.) (outlining England's so-called "reliable
standards of journalism" test). Qualified privilege, at English common law,
attached to any occasion where the person who makes a communication has
an interest or duty to do so. This usually arose in small, reciprocal
relationships, such as writing a job reference. Reynolds extended this privilege
for media defendants to disseminate political or public interest information to
the public at large, even allowing for the dissemination of false political or
public facts, so long as the defendant can prove it acted responsibly. In
Reynolds, Lord Nichols created a non-exclusive list of factors courts should
consider when assessing the "responsibility" of the journalism, such as the
seriousness of the allegations, the urgency of the matter, and the inclusion of
both sides of the story. Id.
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allegations were true, even though as a journalist she had no access
to classified information and no subpoena power to compel officials
to verify it.57  This is simply not true. Had Ehrenfeld actually
submitted to jurisdiction, she stood a very good chance of winning
the case on the merits by relying on Reynolds.5 Because she simply
failed to show up, the High Court was left with little choice but to
award bin Mahfouz's judgment. Therefore, those pursuing
individual libel lawfare cases can be defeated by application of the
Reynolds privilege; this militates in favor of a case-by-case analysis,
in which courts take the time to examine the standards of the
journalism employed.
57. See Lappen, supra note 41.
58. This is so even despite notoriously prejudicial comments issued by
the trial judge. In court, Justice Eady ordered Ehrenfeld to apologize, retract
her statements, pay $225,913.37 in damages, and destroy copies of her book.
See id., supra note 41. After Justice Eady was informed that former CIA
director James R. Woolsey had written the forward for Ehrenfeld's book, he
notoriously retorted, "Say no more ... I award you a judgment by default, and
if you want, an injunction, too." Id.
However, since issuing the default judgment, the House of Lords has re-
emphasized that it nonetheless intends to enforce Reynolds-and it did so in a
case whose facts are almost indistinguishable from Ehrenfeld's. See generally
Martin Roger Scordato, The International Legal Environment For Serious
Political Reporting Has Fundamentally Changed: Understanding the
Revolutionary New Era of English Defamation Law, 40 CONN. L. REV. 165,
175-76 (2007). On October 11, 2006, in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe,
[20061 UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359 (appeal taken from Eng.), just months
after the High Court issued its default in Ehrenfeld case, the House of Lords
gave a ringing endorsement of Reynolds. Id. On February 6, 2002, the Wall
Street Journal Europe ran an article titled Saudi Officials Monitor Certain
Bank Accounts: Focus is on Those with Potential Terrorist Ties. Id. at 171.
The article specifically named a number of companies whose accounts were
being monitored, including a company operated by Mohammed Abdul Latif
Jameel. Id. at 171-72. Jameel brought suit against the Wall Street Journal
alleging that he had been defamed for being associated with terror financing.
Id. at 172. The jury found against the defendants and awarded Jameel a
monetary judgment. Id. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision. Id. The
House of Lords reversed, finding that the trial court and the Court of Appeal
had erred in denying the defendants' qualified privilege. Id. at 175.
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3. The current legislation mistakes free speech-and not
jurisdictional issues-as the central divide between England's and
America's responses to individual libel lawfare
Although the panelists at the conference bewailed the
absence of free speech protections in England, individual libel
lawfare has less to do with free speech and more to do with thorny
jurisdictional issues arising out of an underdeveloped approach to
jurisdiction in the Internet age.: 9 Commentators insist that the
probability of winning the case is not enough, i.e., American
authors and journalists should not be forced to submit to a suit in a
foreign jurisdiction in the first place, but this jurisdictional problem
is not addressed in the current legislation.
Before the "emergence of the Internet, each country could
workably set its own ceiling for the protection of expression without
having an adverse impact on other countries that might make a
different choice., 60 Now, however, the Internet has placed
enormous strains on national free speech protections, particularly
America's. While other countries fear the imposition of American
free speech hegemony, America fears that free speech protections
for its own citizens will be undermined by global connectivity. The
Ehrenfeld case saw a Saudi banker suing an American journalist in
English courts over the unintended publication of twenty-three
59. Panelists at the Conference and sponsors of the laws constantly
extolled the virtues of America's free speech framework as compared to that
of England. Yet England possesses a rich free speech tradition from John
Locke, to John Stuart Mill, to Thomas Paine and Milton's Areopagitica.
Moreover, it continues to reinforce the rights of journalists and authors,
evidenced by both the Reynolds and Jameel decisions. England also has a rich
history of protecting reputational interests; thus, it is forced to grapple with
the inherent tensions between the two rights to a greater degree than America
is. Despite its lack of a First Amendment, England still protects speech in as
robust a way as any other country besides America. American commentators
spend too much time focusing on the minute differences in the two countries'
approaches to free speech and not enough time recognizing that England is
America's closest free speech ally in a war against an ideology that affords
speech no premium at all.
60. Kurt Wimmer, Toward a World Rule of Law: Freedom of Expression,
603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202, 202 (2006).
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books from an online retailer located in America. Ehrenfeld did
not intentionally publish in England; yet because of the
omnipresence of Internet publication, England felt justified in
assuming jurisdiction over her.6' For many common sense
American legalists, this offends fundamental concepts of due
process and comity. They rightly ask what possible interest
England could have in vindicating the reputation of a Saudi
billionaire "defamed" by an American journalist, when the
American journalist had no intention of publishing under England's
jurisdiction and when that billionaire possessed only minimal
contacts to England's jurisdiction.
If anything, the Ehrenfeld case proves that Internet
jurisdiction has become a global problem and is in need of a global
solution. It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a
comprehensive jurisdictional plan; suffice it to say, American
legislative efforts have ignored the problem altogether, satisfied
instead to focus on a largely imagined free speech divide. The
individual libel lawfare debate could benefit greatly from
minimizing the rhetoric and focusing, instead, on the emerging
jurisdictional problems. Both countries could benefit from studying
the enlightened approach followed by the European Union in its E-
Commerce Directive, in which the "country of origin" principle
minimizes most of the difficult issues, jurisdictional or otherwise,
arising with international content litigation."'
61. See Berezovsky v. Michaels, [2000] UKHL 25 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (holding that claimants are entitled to bring their claim in the U.K. so
long as they possess a modicum of reputation in the jurisdiction and the
defamatory communication was published more than a de minimis number of
times).
62. See generally Wimmer, supra note 60, at 210. ("On June 8, 2000, the
EU adopted Directive 2000/31/EC (the 'E-Commerce Directive'), which
establishes basic harmonized rules on ... cross-border Internet publication."
In it, "companies are subjected only to the jurisdiction and the law of the
Member State in which they are established," i.e., the "country of origin"
principle.).
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4. The current legislation only attempts to provide a uniform
solution to international individual libel lawfare, while completely
ignoring a uniform solution to the homegrown kind.
In addition to their misguided approach to international
individual libel lawfare, the current legislative efforts do nothing to
prevent homegrown individual libel lawfare, i.e., harassment suits
that are jurisdictionally sound but are nonetheless designed to chill
free speech. 63  Just as a case-by-case approach, coupled with
jurisdictional reform, is probably the most principled solution for
international individual libel lawfare, anti-SLAPP legislation, which
is used in some-but not all-states, represents a more principled
way to combat homegrown individual libel lawfare.
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP)
are suits brought against people participating in the democratic
process by people claiming to have been wronged by that
participation, i.e., a defamation action against citizens exercising
First Amendment rights. 64 Therefore, by definition, anti-SLAPP
legislation is perfectly suited to combat both kinds of individual
libel lawfare. 65 Because not all states have enacted anti-SLAPP
legislation,66 it simply has not received the kind of attention needed
to constitute a sufficient disincentive against individual libel
lawfare. That, however, is changing in America, if not in England.
In California, which has the most robust anti-SLAPP legislation of
63. In England and America respectively, the Alms for Jihad case and
the Joe Kaufman case, discussed supra Part II, would fit the bill.
64. Jacquelyn Kline, Anti-SLAPP Statutes in the U.S. by State, THE
LEGAL PROJECT, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.legal-project.org/article/149 (citing
2 LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9:107 (2d ed.)).
65. Id. California's anti-SLAPP law provides a special motion a
defendant can file at the outset of a lawsuit to strike a complaint where the
complaint arises from conduct that falls within constitutionally-protected
rights, such as petition or free speech. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 425.17(a)
(West 2009) (stating "participation in matters of public significance ... should
not be chilled through the judicial process").
66. Kline, supra note 64.
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any state, "'[t]here has been a fairly dramatic decline in the number
of libel cases being filed."'
67
One provision that appears in New York's Rachel's Law
and in the Free Speech Protection Act is worth saving-the award
of treble damages if it is determined that the person bringing the
foreign lawsuit intentionally engaged in a scheme to suppress free
speech rights.6 This provision is effectively international anti-
SLAPP legislation and remains sound because it protects authors
and journalists from frivolous lawsuits, while still insisting on a
case-by-case analysis of each instance of individual libel lawfare.
D. Conclusion to Individual Libel Lawfare
One thing needs to be made abundantly clear-the previous
section questioning the wisdom of legislative efforts combating
individual libel lawfare in no way means to suggest that the
phenomenon of individual libel lawfare is somehow imagined or
unintimidating. However, legislative responses either continue to
67. Judith Miller, A SLAPP Against Freedom: Attorneys have an effective
new way to defeat Islamic groups' libel suits, CITY J., Autumn 2007,
http://www.city-journal.org/html/17-4-sndgs0l.html (quoting libel law
attorney Roger Myers). Miller's article discusses a classic example of the
effective use of Anti-SLAPP legislation: the Matthew Levitt litigation in
California. KinderUSA, an Islamic charity sued Levitt, a former Treasury
Department Official, for making false statements about KinderUSA's ties to
terrorist groups, including Hamas. Instead of settling, Levitt invoked
California Anti-SLAPP and KinderUSA dropped the suit less than six weeks
later. This article goes on to list instances in which anti-SLAPP legislation has
resulted in summary dismissals in individual libel lawfare cases in
Massachusetts, California, and Minnesota. Id.
68. See H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. § 3(d) (2009). See also Libel Terrorism
Protection Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304 (McKinney 2010). The "proposal for an
affirmative cause of action against litigants like bin Mahfouz who scheme to
suppress American First Amendment rights do not coerce any country to
either adopt or enforce our livelihood. It would simply tell the libel tourist, 'if
you scheme to deprive Americans of a fundamental constitutional right, you
can no longer do it with impunity. We will arm Americans with reciprocal
power to sue you for damages in a court far from your home, albeit one that
will surely give you a better shake than US journalists have gotten in the
British court." Andy McCarthy, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing
Criticism of Radical Islam Conference (May 19, 2009).
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miss the mark or are not yet sufficiently robust. Thus, the foregoing
represents an attempt to define clearly individual libel lawfare as its
own distinct phenomenon, to describe its different forms, i.e.,
homegrown and international, and to explore areas where
England's and America's "counteroffensive" can be improved.
While individual libel lawfare represents a dire threat to free
speech, it should still be addressed on a case-by-case basis, with a
higher premium paid to jurisdictional reform than to federal
legislation, which places the law of free nations into formal
disharmony with one other.
E. What is Global Libel Lawfare?
Global libel lawfare consists of any large-scale "attempts by
regional and global organizations to redefine . . . freedom of
speech," i.e., to prohibit speech critical of religion, specifically
Islam. 69 As a result, it is far more dangerous to free speech than
individual libel lawfare, in large part because of its avowed
purpose-that "religious freedom must be silenced and critique of
radical Islam and Muslims [must be] branded as racism and
defamation of an 'established religion."' 7" In other words, global
libel lawfare insists that in Muslims' right to practice religion freely
inheres a different right-the right to practice it free from
criticism-and that genuine criticism about human rights abuses
perpetrated by radical Islam is tantamount to religious
intolerance.7
69. See Goldstein & Meyer, supra note 34.
70. See Dr. Sami Alrabaa, Exclusive: Radical Muslims Abuse Western
Lawfare Systems to Advance their Jihad Agenda, FAMILY SEC. MATTERS, June
24, 2009, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.3567/
pub-detail.asp (examining instances of libel lawfare in western systems,
including the case of Austrian Parliament member Susanne Winter, who
received a prison term and a substantial fine for observing that if he were alive
today, the Prophet Muhammad would be "indicted as a child abuser" for
having married a nine-year-old girl. The judge in the case commented that
"[iut is outrageous to defame a widely established religion.").
71. See Brooke Goldstein, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism
of Radical Islam Conference (May 19, 2009).
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Global libel lawfare relies heavily on the concept of
defamation of religion, which is essentially nothing more than the
concept of blasphemy (defamation of God), coupled with the
concept of religious hate speech (defamation of the Godly). Of
course, blasphemy is not a new concept, nor is it peculiar to radical
Islam. Many Christian blasphemy laws in England, America, and
elsewhere were widely in effect-if not uniformly prosecuted-
from medieval times up until the present day." However, while
blasphemy laws have been instituted among all the great
monotheisms of the world, "not all monotheisms are [acting]
exactly the same at the moment ' 73 and only one is making attempts
to criminalize "defamation of religion" on a global scale through
religious hate speech laws and global resolutions like the recent
U.N. Resolution 7/19, Combating Defamation of Religions.
74
In this sense, global libel lawfare is the name we give to a
culture war, in which Western values, such as freedom of speech
72. See Robert A. Brazener, Validity of Blasphemy Statutes or
Ordinances, 41 A.L.R. 3d 519 (1972) (outlining blasphemy statutes by state
and showing that, when blasphemy statutes were held to be constitutionally
valid in America, it was because the court could find a "secular purpose," such
as protecting against a "breach of the [public] peace."). England enacted the
Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2005), which broadens the swath of the
blasphemy law to create an offense of inciting hatred against a person on the
grounds of any religion. See Ivan Hare, Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows:
Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred, PUB. LAW, 521, 521-38 (2006).
73. Christopher Hitchens, Remarks at a Debate at Hart House,
University of Toronto (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.video.
google.com/videoplay?docid=6379618149058958603.
74. Led by Pakistan, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),
which is the U.N.'s largest voting block, first introduced a binding resolution
"Combating defamation of Islam" more than ten years ago and has tried
uniformly, at Durban I and recently at Durban II, to pass more neutered
versions, such as recent U.N. Resolution 7/19, Combating Defamation of
Religion. H.R.C Res. 7/19, supra note 5. Durban I refers to the World
Conference against Racism sponsored by the U.N. in Durban, South Africa in
2001. United Nations, World Conference on Racism,
http://www.un.org/WCAR/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). In 2009 the U.N.
sponsored the Durban Review Conference ("Durban 1I") in Geneva,
Switzerland, to evaluate progress toward the goals set by Durban I. United
Nations, Durban Review Conference, http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/
(last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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and religion, skepticism, and free inquiry clash with an oppressive
ideology that seeks to maintain power by silencing religious and
cultural dissent through violence and intimidation.15 Through a
steady increase in the promulgation and enforcement of laws that
destroy Western values, radical Islam is making significant inroads,
in part because most in the West do not recognize the invidious
culture war in which they are engaged. Although America
probably retains a sufficiently robust defense against these assaults
because of First Amendment protection, "[b]lasphemy [and hate
speech laws] in the UK, Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Germany [and, most recently, the U.N. Resolution, Combating
Defamation of Religion] are aiding jihadists['] advance [of] their
theocratic agenda., 7 6 Accordingly, to mount a counteroffensive
against global libel lawfare, one must first identify a few of the most
alarming instances of global libel lawfare, and, thereafter, highlight
the bizarre social and legal reasoning underpinning each. As I
conclude, I will briefly examine ways to combat this threat to free
speech and Western values head on.
F. Instances of Global Libel Lawfare
1. Salman Rushdie and The Moral Inversion
The modern era of global libel lawfare probably began after
the 1988 publication of Salman Rushdie's the Satanic Verses, when
"Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini issued his infamous fatwa against
Rushdie, a British citizen at the time."77 As Brooke Goldstein and
Aaron Eitan Meyer point out, "[t]he fatwa marked the beginning of
the end of open discourse-fictional or otherwise-on Islam. '' 7" At
the time, Rushdie was not prosecuted under any hate speech or
blasphemy law, but whether he would be today remains in question.
Indeed, when asked to weigh in on the controversy, many world
75. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 18; see also BARNETT, supra note 18.
76. See Alrabaa, supra note 70.
77. See Goldstein & Meyer, supra note 13, at 17.
78. Id.
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political and religious leaders at the time, such as the Archbishop of
Canterbury, His Holiness the Pope, and the Chief Rabbi of Israel,
made remarks suggesting that the issue in Rushdie's case did not lie
with the suborning of murder for the act of writing a work of
fiction, but rather with blasphemy.7 9
This instance of global libel lawfare highlights a serious
issue that sits at the root of the problem-moral inversion. By
willingly or unwittingly relinquishing speech rights and companion
Western values in favor of hate speech and blasphemy laws, which
seek to protect against "giving offense" to religions, Western
countries take a step toward legitimizing the violence committed by
radical Islamists in the name of "having been offended.
'"m
Regardless of how deep this offense might be, the laws of a free
79. Lou Dobbs Tonight: Crucial Step Towards Shari'a Law? United
Nations Anti-Blasphemy Resolution -Christopher Hitchens (CNN television
broadcast Feb. 26, 2009).
80. Directly after the publication of the Satanic Verses, for example,
"Sayed Abdul Quddus, the secretary of the Bradford Council of Mosques,
claimed that Rushdie had 'tortured Islam' and deserved to pay the penalty by
'hanging' and that "'Muslims here would kill him and I would willingly
sacrifice my own life . . . to carry out the Ayatollah's wishes .... '" See
MELANIE PHILLIPS, LONDINISTAN 10-11 (2006). "Such scenes were
unprecedented in Britain. The home of free speech was playing host to the
burning of books and an openly homicidal witch-hunt. Yet not one person
who called for Rushdie to be killed was prosecuted for incitement to murder."
Id. at 11. Further,
[w]hat was also on conspicuous display was the mind-
twisting, back-to-front reasoning that is routinely used by
many [radical] Muslims to turn their own violent
aggression into victimhood. [Radical] Muslim leaders
claimed that the refusal by the British government to ban
The Satanic Verses showed that Muslims in Britain were
under attack, with the political and literary establishment
trying to destroy their most cherished values. . . . Of
course, it was Britain that was under attack from an
Islamism that required the British state to dump its most
cherished values in order to placate the Muslim minority.
Yet this was promptly inverted to claim that it was Islam
that was under attack.
Id. at 12.
society should never tacitly condone individuals who engage in
violent self-help."'
In the end, the moral inversion problem is admittedly not a
legal argument against global libel lawfare, but rather a
commonsense one. Indeed, as western societies contemplate the
passage or repeal of hate speech and blasphemy laws, they would
do well to begin with something so fundamental.
2. Geert Wilders & The Netherlands-Drawing a Clear Line?
In 2008, a member of the European Parliament, Geert
Wilders, released a ten-minute self-produced film titled Fitna,
which contains quotations from the Koran inciting violence or
death to infidels counterpoised against images of the September 11
attacks and of Imams preaching death to Jews. Six months after the
public prosecutor's office determined that Wilders should not be
prosecuted, the court did an about-face and decreed that charges
may be brought against him because they would be "in the public
interest. '8 2 The court ruled that "Wilders had personally insulted
81. In August 2009, having recently pulled the actual cartoon images
from a would-be definitive, academic book about the Danish cartoon
controversy, Director of Yale University Press John Donatich, defended the
decision, stating that, "when it came between that and blood on my hands,
there was no question." Patricia Cohen, Yale Press Bans Images of
Muhammad in New Book, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at C1. In an editorial
published on Slate.com, Christopher Hitchens rightly condemned this latest
moral inversion unequivocally, stating of a hypothetical extremist who would
take offense at-and revenge for-the publication of the cartoons in question,
"I deny absolutely that I will have instigated him to do so, and I state in
advance that he is directly and solely responsible for any blood that is on any
hands." Christopher Hitchens, Yale Surrenders: Why did Yale University Press
Remove Images of Mohammad from a book about the Danish Cartoons,
SLATE, Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2225504/.
82. News Staff, Geert Wilders prosecuted for Hate Speech, NRC
HANDELSBLAD, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2126874
.ece/Geert_Wildersprosecuted for hatespeech. If convicted by the
prosecution in the Netherlands, Wilders faces up to sixteen months of jail time
and a fine of more than 39,000. Diederik van Hoogstraten, Holland Puts
Offensiveness on Trial, FORBES, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/
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Muslim believers by attacking the symbols of Islam" and by injuring
"Muslims in their religious dignity." ''  In doing so, it stated that in
"a democratic legal system a clear line about hate speech in the
public debate needs to be drawn.""
The Dutch court was right to insist upon drawing a clear
line in public debate; however, its erroneous ruling severely blurred
that line. While every jurisdiction has its own legal framework for
determining when a statement is defamatory, some principles
should be universal. First, in any free society, the truth of the
statement should always protect the speaker from liability. This
seems axiomatic, but Wilders simply cited quotations from the
Koran and counterpoised them against images of terror. Although
provocative, inflammatory, and, at most, out of context, nothing in
the film misquoted the Koran or lied about terror attacks. Yet, he
was still prosecuted. If speakers are not even allowed to speak the
truth, regardless of how inflammatory it may be, how can there be
any objective standard by which to measure what speech is
permissible and what is not?"' Indeed, Wilders "cited to the Koran
01/25/geert-wilders-speech-opedcx-dvh_0126vanhoogstraten.html. Moreover,
on February 12, 2009, the United Kingdom denied entry to Wilders on the
grounds that he was a threat to public order and public harmony, despite the
fact that he had been invited there by two members of the House of Lords for
a showing of Fitna in the Palace of Westminster. Dutch politician Geert




83. News Staff, Geert Wilders prosecuted for Hate Speech, NRC
HANDELSBLAD, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.nrc.nl/international/article
2126874.ece/GeertWilders-prosecuted for hatespeech.
84. Id.
85. To provide another example of the criminalization of the truth:
"Susanne Winter, a member of the Austrian FPO party and member of
parliament was recently sentenced to three months of prison on probation and
a fine of 324,000," for stating "'if the prophet Muhammad were living, he
would be indicted as a child abuser. .. ' [because] Muhammad married Aisha,
a nine-year old girl and consummated this marriage years before she had her
first menses." Although it may be unfair to hold medieval figures to 21st
century standards of moral conduct, the statement, on its face, is probably
true. Nonetheless, the judge sentencing Winter stated, "'[ilt is outrageous to
defame a widely established religion."' See Alrabaa, supra note 70.
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itself. How much truer can you get? Now, it is being
institutionalized into Western laws that we can't do it because it
gives offense?,,8
6
The criminalization of "giving offense" leads to the second
objection to the Dutch court's ruling. In any free society, speakers
must be able to determine, in advance, whether their statements
will subject them to liability. When analyzing whether a statement
will offend the listener(s), a speaker can never know if what he is
saying will actually cause offense until someone later finds it
subjectively offensive."' An insidious tautology lurks here, which in
Wilders' case, invariably creates a chilling effect on open and free
discourse. Geert Wilders may be an inflammatory and utterly
unpleasant person. However, in a free society, the millions of
Muslims he may have offended would also be free to say something
to that effect -or worse. But that is where the legal line should be
drawn. After the decision to prosecute Wilders, however, even
Muslims should fear that their own statements condemning him
might cause offense to someone whose religion consists of
enlightenment values and, in a bizarre but perfectly legitimate twist,
subject them to liability for offending them.
3. U.N. Resolution 7/19 "Combating Defamation of Religions"
Perhaps the single biggest instance of global libel lawfare is
the one that has been consistently waged by the Organization of the
Islamic Conference ("OIC") in the U.N.'s Human Rights Council
each of the past ten years. The most recent attempt, Resolution
7/19, Combating Defamation of Religions, received widespread
notoriety in 2009. Deceivingly innocuous in its purported
protection against acts of hatred, discrimination, intimidation, and
86. Frank Gaffney, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of
Radical Islam Conference (May 19, 2009).
87. At the conference, Alan Derschowitz made a similar point that, in
America, this would be a classic violation of the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that the government only enforce
laws by which citizens will know in advance how to guide their actions. Alan
Derschowitz, Remarks at Libel Lawfare: Silencing Criticism of Radical Islam
Conference (May 19, 2009).
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coercion resulting from "defamation of religion," the resolution, on
its face, seems like a good idea. After all, why would anyone be
against protecting religion? However, those who dismiss it as a
benign, multi-cultural attempt to protect the integrity of all world
religions have obviously failed to read it. Islam is the only religion
mentioned by name in any of the so-called "defamation of
religions" resolutions, which purport to protect other "divine
religions" but which mention them nowhere. Resolution 7/19 states
in part,
The Human Rights Council ....
Noting with deep concern the increasing trend
in recent years of statements attacking
religions, including Islam and Muslims, in
human rights forums,
1. Expresses deep concern at the negative
stereotyping of all religions and manifestations
of intolerance and discrimination in matters of
religion or belief;
2. Also expresses deep concern at attempts to
identify Islam with terrorism, violence and
human rights violations and emphasizes that
equating any religion with terrorism should be
rejected and combated by all at all levels;
3. Further expresses deep concern at the
intensification of the campaign of defamation
of religions and the ethnic and religious
profiling of Muslim minorities in the aftermath
of the tragic events of 11 September 2001.... '9
Despite its one-sidedness, the resolution seeks to exert
global legal influence, urging states to adopt measures that would
provide direct private rights of action for citizens injured by this so-
88. Even though the resolution passed by a recorded vote of 21-10, with
14 abstentions, the following countries were, in fact, against it: Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland,
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
H.R.C. Res. 7/19, supra note 5.
89. Id. at $ 1-3 (emphasis added).
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called defamation." Should states comply, especially Western ones,
they would be forced to ignore two longstanding tenets of
defamation law. Foremost, in purporting to protect against
defamation of Muslims everywhere, the resolution makes a
mockery of group defamation law. In America, and to a large
degree in England,
[wihen a defamation concerns a group of
people, and one or more members of that
group bring a libel or slander action, thorny
questions are presented as to whether
communication is "of and concerning" the
plaintiff or plaintiffs. The general rule is that if
the group is so large that "there is no likelihood
that a reader would understand the article to
refer to any particular member of that group,"
it is not libelous of any individual. As the size
of the group increases, it becomes more and
more difficult for the plaintiff to show he was
the one at whom the article was directed.9'
Put another way, the law of group defamation protects the
reputations of individuals, not the beliefs or the hurt feelings of
groups. Thus, the only way to create any workable protection
against so-called group defamation would be through the
implementation of some kind of wide-sweeping hate speech law,
which we have already shown is fraught with its own set of pitfalls.
Second, the resolution ignores the fact that determining the
truth or falsity of religious claims is arguably impossible. Divine
revelation is not objective. Suffice it to say, the opening verse of
the Koran, when translated, states "This book is not to be
doubted."' 2  By definition then, any scientific claim about the
origins of the universe or one from a competing religion that
90. Subsection 9 of the resolution "urges States to provide, within their
respective legal and constitutional systems, adequate protection ... ." Id. at
9.
91. ROBERT SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: GROUPS AND GROUP
MEMBERS 2-140 § 2.9.4.1 (3rd ed., Practicing Law Inst. 2009).
92. KORAN, The Cow 2:1 (N.J. Dawood trans., Penguin Books 1990).
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diverges from Islamic dogma, necessarily "defames" Islam and
could potentially subject the speaker to liability. When interviewed
on CNN about the U.N. Resolution, Christopher Hitchens
explained:
The claim of Islam is that it is the last and final
revelation from God to humanity. It's quite a
big claim to make .... You don't need another
book after the Koran .... Now that's okay,...
but now [the resolution] want[s] to say if you
have any difficulty with this idea, if you have
any doubts about it, you're not allowed to
express them because, if you do, you are
insulting us. . . . [Imagine] those two claims
together: one a fantastic claim and the other a
fantastic claim that you can't challenge. That is
totalitarianism defined. 93
D. Conclusion to Global Libel Lawfare
Another thing needs to be made abundantly clear-the
above section questioning the wisdom of hate speech laws in no
way means to suggest that tolerance, religious sensitivity, and
respectful discussion are to be discarded. There is obviously great
benefit to respectful discussion about controversial claims.
However, global libel lawfare seeks both to silence civilized
discussion and to eviscerate free speech by insisting that it could not
only cause offense but also subject Muslims to hatred and
intimidation on the basis of their religion. Far from protecting
Muslims, global libel lawfare actually places moderate Muslims
living in the theocratic countries that institutionalize this concept in
the most danger. While authors and journalists in the West face
lawsuits, moderate Muslims who speak out about the human rights
abuses perpetrated by radical Islamists and who live in countries
that forbid "defamation of religion" face an existential threat.
In the end, global libel lawfare is nothing more than
recasting of the medieval vice of blasphemy, used by ruthless
93. Lou Dobbs. supra note 79.
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theocracies for centuries, into a multicultural virtue by a coalition
of radical Islamists, many Islamic governments, and members of
Western society unconvinced of radical Islam's threat. Hence, the
first step towards combating this great leap backwards is to
recognize that it exists. America is probably safe for now.
Conference panelist James Taranto convincingly reminded the
conference that the United States has an expansive and robust free
speech regime that is in no danger of being overturned.94 Other
countries are not so safe, however. Their first line of defense is an
awareness of actually how legally and socially dubious is the
concept of "defamation of religions." When faced with the decision
whether to pass or repeal hate speech and blasphemy laws, England
and Europe must be alert to the true intent of these laws.
If this defense is insufficient, Aaron Eitan Meyer has
proposed a more proactive solution: "If Europeans can be
prosecuted by Islamists using the European Union's legal system,
should it then not follow that radical Imams in Muslim countries
can be cited by European citizens and extradition be requested by
them to European courts for their anti-Semitic and anti-Christian
rhetoric?" 95 Since Meyer was one of the first writers to discuss the
crucial distinction between individual libel lawfare and global libel
lawfare, we would be wise to give his ideas, fantastic or not, the
benefit of the doubt. Indeed, if the West does not wish to fight for
its core values, then at least it could try to beat radical Islam at its
own game. As a result of their constant vitriol, the first people who
would be prosecuted under these global libel lawfare laws would
probably be the radical Islamists themselves.
94. Taranto stated that America protects both free speech and hate
speech, as seen, for example, in the case National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432
U.S. 43 (1977). He also pointed out that the Supreme Court extended this
protection in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)(holding that there is a
difference between advocacy and incitement, and that a government cannot
punish inflammatory speech unless it is directed to incitement and is likely to
cause imminent lawless action). James Taranto, Remarks at Libel Lawfare:
Silencing Criticism of Radical Islam Conference (May 19, 2009).
95. Goldstein & Meyer, supra note 36.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing represents a synthesis of some of the most
meaningful - and controversial - ideas currently being
promulgated in the libel lawfare debate. Part I was devoted to
eliminating unnecessary semantic confusion plaguing the debate.
By defining and distinguishing many of the terms that have been
consistently misused in the debate, like radical Islam, libel tourism
and libel lawfare, Part I offered a more principled approach to
analyze libel lawfare on a fundamental level. Part II was devoted to
exploring the crucial distinction between the small- and large-scale
types of the phenomenon. Part II.A began by defining individual
libel lawfare as individual libel cases in England and America, like
the Ehrenfeld and Alms for Jihad cases, and in so doing, identified
the two different kinds of individual libel lawfare, to wit,
homegrown and international. Finally, it explored England's and
America's "counteroffensive" and showed how most of the
legislative responses, like the Free Speech Protection Act and anti-
SLAPP legislation, either continue to miss the mark or are not yet
sufficiently robust. It concluded by determining that, while
individual libel lawfare represents a dire threat to free speech, it
should still be addressed on a case-by-case level, with a higher
premium paid to jurisdictional reform than to federal legislation,
which places the law of free nations into formal disharmony with
one other.
Part II.E began by defining global libel lawfare as large-
scale attempts by regional and global organizations to restrict
freedom of speech to prohibit speech critical of religion, specifically
Islam. It proceeded to outline a few of the most shocking instances
of global libel lawfare, such as the prosecution of Geert Wilders and
U.N. Resolution 7/19, "Combating defamation of religions." Each
individual instance was then used to illustrate the legally dubious
reasoning underpinning many hate speech and blasphemy laws in
England and Europe. It concluded by showing that global libel
lawfare seeks both to silence civilized discussion and to eviscerate
free speech by insisting that speech critical of Islam could not only
cause offense but also subject Muslims to hatred and intimidation
on the basis of their religion. Far from protecting Muslims, global
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libel lawfare actually places moderate Muslims living in the
theocratic countries that institutionalize this concept in the most
danger. Accordingly, when faced with the decision whether to pass
or repeal hate speech and blasphemy laws, England and Europe
must be alert to the true intent of these laws.
By recognizing that two different kinds of libel lawfare exist,
future debates can propose more precise tactics in combating them.
Where this counteroffensive is weak or misguided (individual libel
lawfare) or where Western society often fails even to realize that a
problem even exists (global libel lawfare), the failures must be
highlighted, the underlying causes examined, and compelling
alternatives explored. It is only by these investigations that we can
glimpse the future of the libel lawfare counteroffensive, which
remains in a jungle, finding its way by trial and error, building the
road behind it as it proceeds.
96
96. A similar quotation-"[W]e are in a jungle and find our way by trial
and error, building our road behind us as we proceed." -has been attributed
to Max Born, Quantum Physicist, Nobel Prize Winner, 1882-1970. JOANNE
BAKER, 50 PHYSICS IDEAS You REALLY NEED TO KNOW 110 (2007).
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